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Psycho-Mimeses in Aby Warburg
The concept of mimesis (Nachahmung) recurs throughout almost the 
entire temporal and thematic span of Aby Warburg’s work. This is not 
to say that Warburg ever developed a systematic account of mimesis as 
such, and not even of the role which mimesis specifically plays in the pro-
duction, reception, and general cultural functioning of images—themes 
central to his Kultur- and Bildwissenschaft, as well as to his art historical 
studies. The absence of such a systematic analysis, or even a concise and 
reliable definition, is hardly surprising, since Warburg was anything but 
a builder of systematically organized theoretical or scientific edifices. Yet, 
the insistence with which the topic returns in his writings demonstrates 
at least a systematic interest on Warburg’s part and allows his readers 
to formulate a few organizing observations.1 The present contribution 
offers a cross-section of a number of Warburg’s works, reaching from 
his early Grundlegende Bruchstücke zu einer pragmatischen Ausdrucks-
kunde and a few of his art historical studies, to comparatively late texts 
such as the lecture on the snake ritual of the Hopi tribes and the intro-
duction to the Mnemosyne-Atlas, a thematically organized inventory of 
transhistorically recurring figural patterns—bodies caught in movement 
and gesticulation—in the visual arts from Greek antiquity to Warburg’s 
present.1 Throughout all of these texts, a fragmentary, but not entirely 
inconsistent notion of mimesis emerges which covers subject-to-object-
imitations as well as object-to-object-imitations. In the first case mimesis 
functions as the link that binds the perceiving subject to the object of 
perception or—more specifically—as a perceptual function which posits 
anthropomorphizing similarity between subject and object. In the sec-
ond case mimesis creates a link of resemblance between a human figure, 
Der Artikel unternimmt – unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der bislang unveröffentlich- 
ten Aufzeichnungen zur Ausdruckskunde – 
eine systematisierende Rekonstruktion von 
Warburgs fragmentarischer Theorie der Nach- 
ahmung. Warburg denkt Mimesis als psycholo- 
gischen Vorgang, der Perzeptions- und Emo-
tionsprozesse mit affektiven Feedbacks ver-
knüpft, die durch Symbolisierungsleistungen 
erzeugt werden. Dabei erhält Warburg we-
sentliche Impulse aus der Einfühlungsästhetik 
und insbesondere aus Robert Vischers Schrift 
Das optische Formgefühl. Besonderes Augen- 
merk gilt den von Warburg beschriebenen 
Effekten mimetischer Vorgänge: dem Gefühl, 
das aus dem Ähnlichkeitsabgleich zwischen 
der Gestalt des wahrnehmenden und des 
wahrgenommenen Körpers entsteht; der an-
thropomorphisierend-projektiven Funktion 
der Ursachensetzung im Wahrgenommenen 
sowie ihrer psychisch-distanzierenden Funk-
tion. Außerdem skizziert der Text die zeit-
lichen und strukturellen Variationen, die 
Warburgs Mimesis-Verständnis im Vergleich 
zur Nachahmungslehre der klassischen Äs-
thetik (Winckelmann) anbietet.
1 / The aim and scope of this article do 
not allow for an exhaustive treatment of 
the entirety of Warburg’s writings, nor will 
it be possible to do full justice to Warburg-
scholarship here. However, since the pre-
sent text forms part of a more encompassing 
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investigation into the relation of af-
fectivity, the function of art and im-
ages, and formal instability in War-
burg’s thought, the author hopes 
to give a more complete account in 
the not too distant future. Thanks 
to Claudia Wedepohl for directions 
through Warburg’s notes at the ar-
chive of the Warburg Institute; to 
Christopher Wood, whose seminars 
at Yale University provided a first fo-
rum for some of these ideas; and to 
Jess Atwood Gibson for her editorial 
support.
1   Aby Warburg, Bilderatlas 
Mnemosyne, panel 6, London, 
Warburg Institute 
a wave of hair, textile drapery and their respective pictorial representations, 
but also between the snake and a strike of lightning, as depicted in symbol-
ic Hopi drawings. 2 In addition to these two aspects, Warburg also theoriz-
es more complex mimetic processes that feed back from object-imitations 
into the subject-object-relation and alter, or differentiate it. He holds that 
the artistic return of later periods to the figural patterns of Greek antiquity, 
but also the imitation of animal figures in ritual practices, to quote but two 
examples, exert an influence on how the mimetically triggered processes in 
the perceiving subject take shape at the level of emotions.
To promise the reader of the present text a coherent and all-encompassing 
presentation of Warburg’s ideas on imitation would amount to an act of 
deception. However, two reliable aspects can be identified in advance. First, 
as briefly laid out above, Warburg’s concept of mimesis spans more than a 
2  Hopi schoolboy, Lightning 
with serpent head , 1896, drawing, 
London, Warburg Institute
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single level, and he operates at least implicitly with the notion of a mod-
ulation between various types of mimetic processes. Therefore it seems 
more appropriate to speak of Warburg’s mimeses, rather than assuming 
a unified, coherent, single Warburgian (notion of ) mimesis. Second, 
these Warburgian mimeses seem to relate throughout to questions of 
the sensorium, feelings, and emotions. Warburg’s theory of imitation 
develops from the discourse of Einfühlungsästhetik and it receives, 
more specifically, key impulses from Robert Vischer’s treatise Das op-
tische Formgefühl. The fact that Warburg was familiar with this text is 
well established, but the extent to which Vischer’s theory of empathy 
corresponds with Warburg’s conceptualization of mimetic processes is 
still surprising. One of the present article’s intentions therefore consists 
in tracing and highlighting these correspondences between Vischer’s 
and Warburg’s works. On a more general level, the article argues that 
Warburg’s theory of imitation not only models various psychologi-
cal and sensorial processes as mimetic. It also argues that, reciprocally, 
Warburg conceives of mimesis in psychological terms. Hence the no-
tion of “psycho-mimeses” which appears in the title of this article, and 
of which the following pages seek to give an account. 
i  Perception as Imitation—Einfühlung 
Mimesis, understood as techné that enables the production of images, 
appears most prominently in Warburg’s writing with regard to the re-
presentation of movement. In one of his last texts, the introduction to 
the Mnemosyne-Atlas, Warburg writes of a “Darstellung des bewegten 
Lebens” (representation of moving life).2 This formulation could serve 
as an accurate description of his main object of scholarly interest, 
namely the pictorially-mimetic rendering of movement in figures.3 In 
2 / All translations are by the author; 
the ideal was not to achieve stylistic ele-
gance, but rather to find a rendering that 
approximates the original as closely as 
possible.
3 / Aby Warburg: Mnemosyne. Einlei-
tung. Letzte Fassung. 1927. WIA 111.103.1, 
A5. Abbreviations follow the call num-
ber system and pagination employed by 
the Warburg Institute Archive (WIA) in 
London. 
Warburg’s work these figures appear, for example, in the form of antique 
depictions of raging maenads; 3 as ‘a female servant in Ghirlandaio’s 
painting who rushes into the scene of St. John the Baptist’s birth’ and 
as whom Warburg identified a young woman swiftly entering a chamber 
in Ghirlandaio’s Birth of St. John the Baptist ; 4  and even in the motif of 
the hurrying woman that Warburg discovered on the postal stamps of his 
own time. In nearly all cases the movement of these figures is evident, and 
is represented either through the rendering of motor agitation (running 
legs, swinging arms), through gestural activity, or through animated 
supplements, i. e. ornamental indicators (bewegtes Beiwerk), such as the 
drapery of a dress or the curls of a figure’s hair caught and carried by the 
wind.4 By using the term “körperliche Ausdrucksbewegungen” (expres-
sive movements of the body) Warburg also implies that his concept of 
movement is not merely confined to a bodily level; rather, it encompass-
es both physical and psychological movement.5 The agitated body and 
the agitated psyche are, thus, the doubly moved object of Warburgian 
mimesis.
A note from the Grundlegende Bruchstücke zu einer pragmatischen Aus- 
druckskunde—a collection of aphoristic theoretical speculations initial- 
ly titled Grundlegende Bruchstücke zu einer monistischen Kunstpsycho-
logie which Warburg began to formulate around the time of his disserta-
tion—makes evident that Warburg’s association of mimesis and move-
ment is not limited to the realm of accurate and convincing pictorial 
representations of physically and psychically agitated figures. Rather, he 
complements his description of the pictorial rendering of movement 
with a psychological speculation about the perceptual processing of such 
artistic representations: 
“Mit der Einführung sich vorwärtsbewegender Figuren wird der Zuschauer ge-
zwungen: die vergleichende Betrachtung mit der anthropomorphistischen zu 
4 / Aby Warburg: Sandro Botticellis 
‘Geburt der Venus’ und ‘Frühling’, in: 
Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. I.I, eds. Horst 
Bredekamp and Michael Diers, Berlin 
1998, p. 5.
5 / WIA III.103.1, C 3. 
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3  Maenad, Neo-Attic relief, 
Naples, Museo Nazionale 
vertauschen. Es heißt nicht mehr: ‘Was 
bedeutet dieser Ausdruck?’ sondern ‘Wo 
will das hin?’ Das Auge vollführt den Fi-
guren gegenüber Nachbewegungen, um 
die Illusion zu erhalten, als ob der Gegen-
stand sich bewegte.” (The introduction of 
forwardly moving figures forces the view-
er: to exchange comparative viewing for 
anthropomorphistic viewing. The question 
is no longer: ‘What does this expression 
mean?’, but rather ‘Where is this directed 
to? ’ The eye performs after-movements in 
relation to the figures, to maintain the il-
lusion as if the object were moving.)6 
The key term here is Nachbewegungen 
—literally “after-movements”, or, more 
elegantly put, “succeeding movements”. 
If the prefix Nach- already suggests a 
general affinity to processes of Nach-
ahmung (literally after- or post-mim-
ing), this suspected proximity is corroborated through a comparison with 
one of the theoretical source-texts for Warburg’s dissertation, namely Ro- 
bert Vischer’s 1872 treatise Das optische Formgefühl.
In the fragment quoted above Warburg assumes that the impression of 
movement is generated through a kinetic perceptual (re)performance 
which occurs while viewing the pictorial representation of a moving fig-
ure, and he also conceives of these inner-organic movements that occur 
in the perceiving subject as mimetic in relation to the perceived stimulus. 
This follows the doctrines of Einfühlungsästhetik which had one of its 
leading figures in Vischer.7 In Das optische Formgefühl Vischer speaks of 
6 / Bruchstücke 7. XI. 190, as quoted in 
Philippe-Alain Michaud: Aby Warburg 
et l’ image en mouvement, Paris 1998, pp.  
79–80. 
7 / A reference to Vischer’s concept of 
“Einfühlung”, as formulated in Über das 
optische Formgefühl, appears in the pref-
ace of Warburg’s dissertation. Cf. War-
burg, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. I.I, p. 5. 
On Warburg’s recourse to Robert Vischer 
cf. already Lorenz Dittmann: Stil – Sym- 
bol – Struktur. Studien zu Kategorien der 
Kunstgeschichte, Munich 1967, p. 97.
4   Domenico Ghirlandaio, Birth 
of  St. John the Baptist (detail), 1486–
1490, fresco, Florence, S. Maria No-
vella, Tornabuoni Chapel
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“Imitationen der Perzeption” (imitations of perception), thereby spell-
ing out explicitly the axiom that perception is a mimetic activity.8 
The mediating mechanism that Vischer posits for such a mimetic in-
terpretation of the perceptual process reveals a further proximity to 
Warburg’s prime object of investigation: “Die dem Reize entsprechen-
den Perzeptionsbewegungen sind im Grunde schon Imitationen, oder 
besser Vermittlungen zwischen Subjekt und Objekt.” (The perceptual 
movements that correspond to the stimulus are basically already imita-
tions, or, rather, mediations between subject and object.)9 It is, in other 
words, the sensation generated through the kinetic activity of percep-
tion, which Vischer assumes to originate in nerves and muscles, that 
replicates the shape and facture of the object of perception and pro-
vides for perceptual mediation.10 Vischer could not be more explicit 
about the mimetic nature that he assigns to the process of perception: 
“Es ist hier wesentlich, daß die Formen des Objektes immer mit andern 
Formen und Mitteln des Subjekts wiederholt werden.” (It is essential 
here that the forms of the object are always repeated through the dif-
ferent forms and means of the subject.)11 For this perceptual repetition 
Vischer uses the term “Nachahmung” (imitation).12 If perceiving is im-
itating, the relation between the body of the perceiving subject and 
the body of the object of perception is, accordingly, defined as one of 
resemblance: “Als Maßstab für den Charakter der Empfindung glaube 
ich, kann man einfach den Begriff der Ähnlichkeit aufstellen.” (I be-
lieve that one can simply posit the concept of resemblance / similarity as 
a measure for the character of a sensation.)13 More specifically: “Ähn-
lichkeit oder Unähnlichkeit des Objektes zunächst mit dem Bau des 
Auges, weiterhin aber mit dem Bau des ganzen Körpers” (similarity 
or dissimilarity of the object first with the structure of the eye, but fur-
ther with the structure of the entire body).14 On the basis of this axiom 
8 / Robert Vischer: “Über das optische 
Formgefühl. Ein Beitrag zur Ästhetik” 
(1872), in: idem, Drei Schriften zum äs- 
thetischen Formproblem, Halle a. d. Saale 
1927, pp. 1–44, here p. 34.
9 / Ibid., p. 34. On the impression of 
movement as the result of an imaginary 
‘moving along’ of forms cf. ibid., p. 17.
10 / Cf. ibid., pp. 9–10 for Vischer’s re-
marks on “Nerven- and Muskelempfin-
dungen” (sensations of nerves and mus-
cles). On “Vitalempfindungen” (feelings 
of vitality), p. 14.
11 / Ibid., p. 34.
12 / Ibid.
13 / Ibid., p. 9.
14 / Ibid., p. 11.
of (perceptually posited) similarity the respective character of every (per-
ceptually provoked) sensation is defined as the result of matching of the 
structure or shape of the perceived object against the perceiving subject: 
“Die Art nun, wie sich die Erscheinung auf baut, wird zu einer Analogie 
meines eigenen Aufbaus; ich hülle mich in die Grenzen derselben wie in 
ein Kleid.” (The manner in which the appearance / phenomenon is built / 
structured becomes an analogy with my own build /structure; I wrap my-
self in its limits like in a dress .)15 Perception and the feelings it engen-
ders consist in pitting the outlines of the body against the outlines of the 
object: “Die Anschauung der äußeren Grenzen einer Form kann sich in 
dunkler Weise mit der Empfindung der eigenen Körpergrenzen kombi-
nieren.” (The beholding of a form’s outer limits can combine itself in an ob-
scure manner with the sensation of the borders of one’s own body.)16
ii  The Nachleben of a Stimulus
Vischer’s text not only offers an analysis of the mimetic structure of per-
ceptual activity, it also develops two perspectives on the psychological 
functioning of (artistic) forms. One of these perspectives connects indi-
rectly to Warburgian theory, the other directly, but both ultimately return 
to questions of mimesis. Vischer defines the basic forms of art not as the 
imitation of independent third phenomena that exist prior to the per-
ceptual link between subject and object; rather, he describes all sorts of 
symbolic practices such as music, language, facial miming, physiognomy 
and gesture as “imitations of forms of expression” (Nachbilden von Ein-
drucksformen).17 If perceiving is imitating, the first object of imitation is, 
then, the imitative activity engendered in the perceiving subject. Art does 
not mime nature or culture as extra-perceptional entities. Rather, art 
mimes the effects of perception itself, understood as affects: 
15 / Ibid., p. 17. Mallgrave and Ikono-
mou trace this model of similarity back 
to Kant and Wundt. Cf. Harry Francis 
Mallgrave and Eleftherios Ikonomou: 
“Introduction”, in: idem (eds.), Empa- 
thy, Form, and Space. Problems in Ger- 
man Aesthetics, 1873–1893, Santa Mo-
nica 1994, pp. 1–85, here pp. 22–23.
16 / Vischer, Formgefühl, p. 13.
17 / Ibid., p. 34. Cf. ibid. for the list of 
symbolic practices.
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“Die Tätigkeit des Auges hat einen Prozeß im ganzen Nervensystem und in der 
ganzen Seele, im ganzen Menschen erregt. Dieses Nachleben darzustellen ist 
der versteckte Selbstzweck jedes naiven Bildens und die Meinung, es hand-
le sich um das Naturvorbild, täuscht sich selbst.” (The activity of the eye has 
stirred some process in the entire nervous system, the entire soul, the entire hu-
man being. The secret reason for any type of naïve form-giving consists in repre-
senting this afterlife; the opinion that the object of this representation would be 
the original in nature is a self-deception.)18 
This passage is particularly interesting because it elucidates to what ex-
tent the aesthetics of empathy from which Warburg’s thought took one 
of its major impulses shares basic assumptions with artistic practices 
of its period, such as Impressionist painting with its rendering of sen-
sations and sensory values on canvases which were, in turn, conceived 
of as occasions for perceiving, rather than for recognizing the depicted 
object as an extra-perceptual entity. Moreover, the passage from Vischer 
is interesting because it adds Über das optische Formgefühl to the list of 
possible sources for the Warburgian concept of Nachleben. In Warburg, 
this term describes the specific temporal model of a persistence of figu-
ral patterns that originate in Greek antiquity, primarily the already men-
tioned agitated figures, but after their initial existence has ceased. It thus 
refers to a peculiar mode of being that begins with an image-entity’s 
de facto disappearance, to continue in perpetual post-mortem returns, 
a mode of revenant after-life. As such it famously entered the formu-
lation of a Nachleben der Antike which served as one of the mission-
statements for the research program of the Kulturwissenschaftliche 
Bibliothek Warburg. Georges Didi-Huberman has restored to the term 
Nachleben its philological and theoretical significance by pointing out 
that Warburg possibly derived the concept from Edward Tylor’s evolu-
tionary anthropology where it figures, for example, in Tylor’s magnum 
opus Primitive Culture.19 Didi-Huberman’s key insight further consists 
18 / Ibid., p. 35.
19 / Cf. Georges Didi-Huberman: 
L’image survivante. Histoire de l’art 
et temps des fantômes selon Aby War- 
burg, Paris 2002, pp. 51–60.
in recognizing in Warburg’s concept of Nachleben a genuine contribu-
tion to theorizing the time/image-nexus. To profile Warburg’s model 
of a temporality of art and image he contrasts it with the early idealist 
model of Winckelmann’s aesthetics and Vasari’s Renaissance-model.20 
In Didi-Huberman’s reading of Vasari, the Renaissance-model posits a 
full return—literally a rebirth—of the lost forms of antiquity after the 
dark Middle-Ages, whereas the retrospective gaze of Winckelmann’s 
idealist art history focuses on an essentially lost object.21 Winckelmann- 
ian art history, one could add, implements the logics of structurally 
unfulfillable desire by constructing Greek classical form as an ideal 
that is as such unattainable, while nonetheless projecting the impera-
tive to strive precisely for this unreachable goal.22 Winckelmann thus 
situates the image in an ideal zone by assigning it to a quasi-mythical 
time while maintaining that this ideal at one point manifested itself in 
the actuality of historical time, thereby throwing the modern idealist 
aesthetician / historian into a characteristic bipolar crisis of alternating 
elation and depression.23 Didi-Huberman holds that Warburg, by con-
trast, works with a model of a ghostly survival of antique forms, of a 
continued temporal existence of image-entities beyond their historical 
lifespan. In this manner, Warburgian Nachleben echoes Tylor’s concept 
of temporal per-sistence in which surviving forms mark a „différentiel 
des deux statuts temporels contradictoires“, a differential between pro-
gress and regress.24 Phenomena such as superstitions exist beyond their 
‘proper’ historical point of time—they are ‘standing over’ (super-stitio) 
from another period, and as such they form phantom-like entities 
which cause temporal ‘impurities’, insistent anachronisms.25 As such 
they cannot possibly become the object of a retrieving motion like the 
one performed by Winckelmann because they persist already, albeit in 
a ghostly manner. 
20 / Cf. Ibid., p. 16.
21 / Cf. Ibid., pp. 11, 17.
22 / Cf. ibid., p. 21.
23 / For an attempt at describing 
this ‘bipolar’ Winckelmannian con-
stitution cf. Philipp Ekardt: “Maß 
und Umriss. Bilder als Regulative 
bei Winckelmann und Warburg”, 
in: Ingeborg Reichle / Steffen Siegel 
(eds.),  Maßlose Bilder. Visuelle Ästhe- 
tik der Transgression, Munich 2009, 
pp. 247–261, here pp. 255–259.
24 / Didi-Huberman, L’image sur-
vivante, p. 53.
25 / Cf. ibid. Another way to de-
scribe the temporality of form and 
image in Warburg would consist in 
understanding their historical re-
occurences as the effect of a perpet-
ual slipping from a state of latency 
into temporal and historical actual-
ity and back again. Cf. Ekardt, Maß 
und Umriss, p. 250.
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In the present context this juxtaposition of Winckelmann and Warburg 
attains renewed significance, because the temporality of form and image 
which Winckelmann develops—and which Warburg rejects—must be 
understood more specifically as a problem of Nachahmung, i. e. as a 
problem of mimesis. The imperative to reproduce the irreproducible 
Greek ideal is not just a question of mere repetition, but is, as attested by 
the title of one of Winckelmann’s major works, an issue that arises in the 
context of Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in 
der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst. Condensed into the dictum that “the 
only way for us to become great, or even, if possible inimitable, is the im-
itation of the art of the ancients” (der einzige Weg für uns groß, ja, wenn 
es möglich ist unnachahmlich zu werden, ist die Nachahmung der Kunst 
der Alten) Winckelmann’s work paradoxically demands imitation in or-
der to achieve inimitability.26 
One unexpected significant aspect to emerge from tracing Warburg’s 
work back to Vischer’s Das optische Formgefühl thus consists in open-
ing the possibility of thinking Nachleben not just as a specific temporal 
model, but as one element in a recalibrated theory of mimesis. If Vischer 
defined the processes initiated in the human organism and psyche by 
a sensory impact as the Nachleben of that stimulus, which in turn be-
comes the object of artistic mimesis, it is perhaps permitted to speculate 
whether, strangely, Warburg’s construction of a Nachleben der Antike 
amounts to a concept of post-antique mimeses that seek to imitate and 
represent the quasi-somatic and psychological processes (impressions of 
movement) set off by the ongoing impact of antique forms which would 
now function no longer as originals or ideal forms, but as stimuli. When 
derived from Robert Vischer, mimesis is merely concerned with imitat-
ing the after-life, the survival of a stimulus, never the impacting pheno 
menon itself; never ancient art as such, only its repercussions. Such an 
26 / Johann Joachim Winckelmann: 
Gedanken über die Nachahmung der 
griechischen Werke in der Malerei 
und Bildhauerkunst, 2., vermehrte 
Auflage 1756, in: idem, Kunsttheore-
tische Schriften, Vol. I, Baden-Baden / 
Straßburg 1962, pp. 1–44, here p. 3.
analogy may at first seem farfetched, but it perhaps appears slightly more 
plausible if one takes into account that on at least one occasion, namely 
in his notebooks on grisaille-technique, Warburg treated the cultural re-
ception of antique forms exactly as a contingent impact that—as a quasi-
stimulus—called for compensation through distancing imitation: “Die 
scheinplastische antike Vortragsweise (Grisaille als Stich bzw. Zeichnung) 
hält das Schattenreich der vorgeprägten Revenants in metaphorischer 
Distanz.” (The faux-plastic antique mode of presentation (grisaille as 
etching or drawing ) keeps the shadow realm of pre-coined revenants at a 
metaphorical distance.)27 
iii  Causation through Projection 
The other trajectory that leads from Vischer’s theory of mimetic empathy 
to Warburg’s work is more obvious and easier to accommodate. There is 
a passage in Das optische Formgefühl in which Vischer moves beyond the 
discussion of the sensory-somatic and psychological processes of empa-
thy and brief ly opens a perspective onto possible cultural functions for 
this drive “to impose and to incorporate our own form into an objective 
form” (unsere eigene Form einer objektiven Form zu unterschieben [sic] 
und einzuverleiben).28 Vischer reverses the mimetic vector here. If in 
earlier cases he described a resemblance between the body of the object 
of perception and the body of the perceiving subject that engendered an 
imitative empathy in the latter, he now posits a reciprocal principle of 
projection whereby the human form functions as the perceptual pattern 
by which the object is promoted to a new level of interpretability, be-
cause it now appears as a quasi-spiritual being. “Diese […] Einfühlung 
[…] werden wir […] als die natürliche Mutter der religiösen Personifika-
tion erkennen.” (We will recognize in this type of empathy the mother of 
27 / The quotation is from Warburg’s 
1929 notebook on Grisaille and appears 
in Ernst H. Gombrich: Aby Warburg. 
An Intellectual Biography, London 1970, 
p. 247. Cf. also Ulrich Port: “‘Katharsis 
des Leidens’. Aby Warburgs ‘Pathosfor-
meln’ und ihre konzeptionellen Hinter-
gründe in Rhetorik, Poetik und Tragö-
dientheorie”, in: Deutsche Vierteljahrs-
schrift für Literaturwissenschaft und 
Geistesgeschichte 73 / Sonderheft (1999), 
pp. 5–42, here p. 34. Cf. also Warburg’s 
definition of art—as well as rationaliz-
ing abstraction —in the Bruchstücke as 
reactions to “eingedrückte Bilder” (im-
ages as im-pres-sions / im-pressed im-
ages). As quoted in: Thomas Schindler: 
Zwischen Empfinden und Denken. As-
pekte zur Kulturpsychologie von Aby 
Warburg, Münster 2000, p. 24. On the 
distancing function of grisaille cf. also 
ibid., p. 177. 
28 / Vischer, Optisches Formgefühl, pp. 
20–21.
114–  ilinx 2, 2011
Ekardt, Psycho-Mimeses in Warburg
115
14–15 / 20
religious personification.)29 In this manner, the basic perceptual mecha-
nism of empathy becomes the ground of a “symbolizing activity” (sym-
bolisierende Tätigkeit) by which natural phenomena acquire the status 
of quasi-personal, but still non-human entities, i.e. godlike or spiritual 
beings, because they are ‘read’ as similar to the form of the human body 
whose perception shapes them in his or her own image.30 This forma-
tion of myth accounts for a type of causal thinking (natürlich kausalen 
Denkens) that Vischer assigns to prehistorical man who does not know 
the real, mechanical grounds (real-mechanische Ursachen).31 
Any reader familiar with Warburg’s work will by now have recognized 
the patent proximities to the model of mythical thought and magical 
action through which the art historian deciphered the ritual practic-
es of the Hopi tribes which he had witnessed on his journey to New 
Mexico in 1895. He developed these ideas in a lecture that he gave in 
1923 to an audience of fellow patients, medical staff—among them his 
doctor Ludwig Binswanger—and friends at the Sanatorium Bellevue 
in Kreuzlingen where Warburg was in treatment after suffering a break-
down. The lecture was later published as Bilder aus dem Gebiet der 
Pueblo-Indianer in Nord-Amerika, although its original title was Über 
die Logik in der Magie des primitiven Menschen.32 In Warburg’s ren-
dering, the Hopi mask dances become “social food service through 
magic practices” (soziale Lebensmittelfürsorge durch magische Prakti-
ken).33 The precariously scarce rain in a desert land is secured, accord-
ing to Warburg, by way of “danced causality” ( getanzte Kausalität):34 
“Es handelt sich hier darum, die Verknüpfung zwischen Naturkraft und 
Mensch, d. h. das Symbolon, das Verbindende zu schaffen, etwa die ma-
gische Handlung, die real verknüpft.” (This concerns generating the 
link between natural force and man, i. e. the symbolon, the connector, 
for example the magic action that produces a real link.)35 The key con-
29 / Ibid., p. 22.
30 / Ibid., p. 27.—Cf. also Warburg’s 
comment on the switch from a com-
parative to an anthropomorphizing 
type of viewing. Cf. footnote 6 .
31 / All quotations Vischer, Optisch- 
es Formgefühl, p. 29.
32 / Cf. Dorothea McEwan: “Zur 
Entstehung des Vortrages über das 
Schlangenritual. Motiv und Motiva-
tion / Heilung durch Erinnerung”, 
in: Cora Bender / Thomas Hensel / 
Erhard Schüttpelz (eds.), Schlangen-
ritual. Der Transfer der Wissensform 
vom Tsu’ti’ kive der Hopi bis zu Aby 
Warburgs Kreuzlinger Vortrag, Ber-
lin 2007, pp. 267–282, here p. 268.
33 / Aby Warburg: Schlangenritual.
Ein Reisebericht. Mit einem Nach-
wort von Ulrich Raulff, Berlin 1988, 
p. 24. 
34 / Ibid., p. 54.
35 / Ibid., p. 37.
duit for this real symbolic handling, i. e. for the magical establishment 
of a causality that works from man towards the environment, is the 
Hopi’s relation to the animal: “wo wir [i. e. Western man] das Gesetz 
hineinverlagern in den unbeeinflußbaren Entwicklungsvorgang durch 
die Natur selbst versuchen die Heiden diesen durch willkürliche Ver-
knüpfung mit der Tierwelt zu erklären.” (where we [i. e. Western man] 
locate the law in the developmental process of nature itself which lies 
beyond our influence, the pagans seek to explain these processes through 
a deliberate connection with the animal realm.)36 This relationship be-
tween (hu)man and animal is situated on two levels, both of which are 
ultimately governed by similarity: at the primary level it occurs through 
a mimetic transformation of the ritual-dancers into the totem-animal 
from which the tribes descended in their mythical world-explanation. 
Warburg recognizes in this “will to animal-metamorphosis” (Wille […] 
zur Tier-Metamorphose) some sort of “Darwinism by way of mythical 
elective affinity” (Darwinismus durch mythische Wahlverwandtschaft ), 
within which processes of “mimic transformation” (mimische Verwand-
lung) occupy a central role.37 According to Warburg, the establishment 
of a resemblance between man and animal performs a function similar 
to the work of the evolutionist who refused to consider humans as a 
species categorically separated from the animal realm, instead positing 
their common descendance. Just like Darwin, the Hopi connect man 
and animal through establishing a link of similarity which runs from 
descendant—man—to (mythical) predecessor, the totem animal.38
In addition to this more general empowerment through a mimetic re-
turn ad fontes stands a second magical relation with the animal, spe-
cifically with the snake which is magico-causally connected with the 
flash through its lightning-like shape.39 The snake qualifies as “provok-
er of lightning or maker of water” (Blitzerreger oder Wassererzeuger) 
36 / Ibid., p. 27.
37 / Ibid. The third quote is from 
WIA III. 54 a, Tagebuch März 1923, 
5887. As cited in Dorothea McEwan, 
Entstehung des Vortrags, pp.  273–
274.
38 / Warburg’s comparison omits 
the central role which difference and 
dissimilarity play in Darwin’s think-
ing. The concept of the differentia-
tion of the species relies precisely on 
the premise of a gradually dissolv-
ing resemblance, a growing rift of 
unlikeness between the species. For 
a reading of Darwin’s works that 
emphasizes the aspect of difference 
with regard to race and sexual di-
morphism, cf. Philipp Sarasin: Dar-
win und Foucault. Genealogie und 
Geschichte im Zeitalter der Biologie, 
Frankfurt a. M. 2009, pp. 280–296.
39 / Warburg, Schlangenritual, p. 
18.
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through its resemblance with the phenomenon to be conjured, name-
ly with lightning that comes with the thunderstorms which bring rain 
to the dry country.40 Warburg did not consider these magical laws of 
similarity confined to non-European so called ‘primitive’ civilizations. 
At the sourcepoint of the European rebirth of classical antiquity, in 
early Renaissance Florence, Warburg discovers the pagan custom of 
commissioning wax votives for chapels. These image-replications of 
the donors were characterized by a strikingly individualized depictive 
style. That is, they were guided by the ideal of achieving a high degree 
of likeness which Warburg, in contrast to the usual understanding of 
the Renaissance as the moment of inception of the modern, suppos-
edly enlightened subject, did not explain by positing an artistic will 
to representing a person in his or her incommensurable individuality. 
Instead, he saw the taste of the Florentine patrons which demanded 
evident resemblance as the outcome of a will to maximize the image’s 
magical efficacy through “this mysteriously effectual identity between 
the donor and his image” ( jene geheimnisvoll wirkende Identität zwi-
schen Stifter und Ebenbild ). According to Warburg, realism, under-
stood as the most accurate rendering of appearances is, then, a mere 
effect of a very specified and optimized case of magic which in turn 
proves to be the point of comparison between Renaissance Florence 
and the Hopi country.41
Already in the Grundlegende Bruchstücke zu einer pragmatischen 
 Ausdruckskunde, written shortly after his journey into the Hopi ter-
ritories, Warburg had attempted to find a theoretical formulation for 
this magical or mythological link of similarity by which man displays 
“causal comportment” (causales Verhalten) towards the animal, and at 
that point he had already identified “Nachahmung” as the key prac-
tice, slightly later to be varied as “Nachahmung durch Einkehr in das 
40 / Ibid., p. 42. Matthew Rampley 
points out that Warburg could have de-
rived this concept of magical mimesis 
from Spencer’s Principles of Sociology 
or Tylor’s Primitive Culture, both of 
which he was familiar with. Tylor held 
that ‘primitive magic’ was grounded 
in an “association of thought” which 
involved “a similar connexion in real-
ity”. Edward Tylor: Primitive Culture, 
Vol. I, London 1871, p. 116. The quota-
tion and Rampley’s argument are from 
Matthew Rampley: “Mimesis and Al-
legory. On Aby Warburg and Wal-
ter Benjamin”, in: Richard Woodfield 
(ed.), Art History as Cultural History. 
Warburg’s Projects, Amsterdam 2001, 
pp. 121–149, here p. 122. Rampley also 
points to the assumption of a “Law 
of Similarity” within which Frazer 
grounded magical thought and prac-
tice in The Golden Bough. Cf. ibid., p. 
123. 
41 / Cf. Aby Warburg: “Flandrische 
Kunst und florentinische Frührenais-
sance”, in: Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. I.1, 
eds. Horst Bredekamp and Michael 
Diers, Berlin 1998, p. 204.
Objekt” (mimesis through communion with / entering into the object).42 
Warburg employs the term “Verleibung” (becoming-body) to account 
for this process—a choice of words that highlights again the close con-
nection between his concept of mimesis and empathy-aesthetics which 
must be regarded as an early example of embodiment theory, at least in 
Vischer’s description of the mimetic constellation as an encounter be-
tween subject and object of perception as bodily entities.43 
iv  Spatialising Mimesis: Distance and Emotion
Two other closely related entries from the Bruchstücke finally point the 
way to a third conceptualization of mimesis in Warburg’s work. This 
third concept complements the notions of imitation as an elementary 
component of the psycho-sensorial mechanism of empathy, and of imi-
tation as the basis for magical practices of causation and influence. Both 
entries date from the same day, March 15, 1896, and Warburg seems to 
set up a basic dialectic of empathic mimesis here, or at least he appears 
to attempt an understanding of empathic mimesis as a bivalent dynam-
ics. The first entry reads: “Künstlerische Nachahmung der Name für das 
Schwerkraftverhältnis in der Ebene zwischen S und O ohne reale An-
näherung (Reduction der Entfernung auf Null). S gewinnt einen festen 
Standpunkt gegenüber O.” (Artistic imitation the name for the gravita-
tional relation on the plane between S and O without real approxima-
tion (reduction of distance to zero). S gains a firm standpoint vis à vis 
O.)44 By parallel with the doctrines of empathy-aesthetics, Warburg’s 
note can perhaps be deciphered as accounting for the relation between 
the perceiving subject (S) and the object of perception (O) as an im-
aginary, or psychological gravitational pull—which is plausible if one 
considers the involuntary nature of empathy as a psycho-perceptual 
42 / WIA , III.43.2, pp. 299, 306.—The 
date of the first entry is 27. i.1896; the 
second dates from 13. III.1896.
43 / WIA , III. 43. 2, p. 299 .— Already 
Lorenz Dittmann grouped Warburg’s 
thinking with a number of art theories 
for which “der Leib als Gegenüber und 
der Leib als Medium” (the body as op-
posite and the body as medium) form a 
constitutive constellation. Cf. Lorenz 
Dittmann: “Kunstwissenschaft und Phä- 
nomenologie des Leibes”, in: Aachener 
Kunstblätter 44 (1973), pp. 287–316, here 
p. 287. On the recurrence of concepts 
of incorporation and embodied projec-
tion (Verleibung) in Warburg’s work cf. 
also Didi-Huberman, L’image surviva-
nte, pp. 390–405.
44 / WIA III.43.2, p. 304.
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automatism that ‘drives’ the subject(’s feeling ) towards the object.45 Al-
though no real approximation occurs, the distance between subject and 
object gravitates toward zero. Against this tendency Warburg posits the 
establishment of a firm standpoint of the subject regarding the object; 
yet, the exact function of artistic imitation or mimesis in this process 
of cancelling distance on the one hand, and establishing a safe posi-
tional relation on the other is at first unclear. So far it merely lends its 
name to the interaction of these counter-directed forces. Some clarity 
can perhaps be gained if one moves on to the succeeding entry in the 
Bruchstücke: “Der ‘künstlerische’ Act ist ein auf das Object bezüglicher 
‘Entfernungsversuch’” (The ‘artistic’ act is a ‘distancing-attempt’ in rela-
tion to the object).46 If one reads the reference to an ‘artistic act’ in the 
second fragment as a rephrasing, or a modification of ‘artistic imita-
tion’ which figures in the first fragment, one can deduce that Warburg 
ascribed the aforementioned distancing -function to (artistic) mimesis. 
To the readers of Warburg’s work this will not come as a surprise, al-
though it might be considered astonishing that at such an early stage of 
his work Warburg was already operating with the concept of a distanc-
ing mimesis. Especially as this concept can be found in a nearly identi-
cal version in Warburg’s lecture on the snake ritual (that is, almost two 
decades later) where it gained a much higher degree of prominence. The 
Kreuzlingen-manuscript describes the effect of mimetic ritual practices 
as the creation of “space as space of worship or thinking-space” (Raum 
als Andachtsraum oder Denkraum) through mythical or symbolic 
thought.47 Warburg employs a related vocabulary in the introduction to 
his Mnemosyne-Atlas. In the depictions of bodies caught in movement 
and gesticulation, the so-called “Pathosformeln”, Warburg recognized 
maximum values of expressive gesticulation (Höchstwerte der Gebärden-
sprache) which were to contain and regulate the passionately shattered 
45 / On a related formulation in War-
burg’s notes on “Symbolismus als Um-
fangsbestimmung” which mentions the 
“Function der Schwerkraft im geistigen 
Haushalt” cf. Cornelia Zumbusch: Wis-
senschaft in Bildern. Symbol und dialek-
tisches Bild in Aby Warburgs Mnemosy-
ne-Atlas und Walter Benjamins Passa-
gen-Werk, Berlin 2004, pp. 236–238.
46 / WIA III.43.2, p. 305.
47 / Warburg, Schlangenritual, p. 59.
48 / WIA III.103.1, B4x; WIA III.103.1, 
C3.
49 / WIA III.103.1, A1. Cf. also the note 
in the Bruchstücke: “Der Erwerb des Dis- 
tanzgefühls zwischen Subj. und Obj. […] 
das Kriterium des Fortschritts des Men-
schengeschlechts.” (The acquisition of the 
feeling of distance between subj. and obj. 
criterion for the progress of mankind.), 
WIA III.43.2, p. 19.
50 / WIA III.103.1, A1.
51 / Warburg, Botticelli, p. 307. The ori-
ginal source is Wilhelm Dilthey: “Die 
drei Epochen der modernen Ästhetik 
und ihre heutige Aufgabe”, in: Deutsche 
Rundschau 72 (1892), p. 219. (Warburg 
also points to the reprint in Dilthey’s Ge-
sammelte Schriften, Vol. 6, pp. 265–266). 
A version of this quote can also be found 
in Warburg’s file card box on aesthetics. 
Cf. Schindler, Zwischen Empfinden und 
Denken, p. 87.
52 / Spatialisation or distancing consti-
tutes only a third of what might be termed 
a psycho-phenomenological formal triad 
through which Warburg describes the ef-
fect of affective regulation. Its other two 
constituents are “Umrissklarheit” (clar-
ity of contour) and “Fassbarkeit” (grasp-
ability). For an initial account of “Um-
rissklarheit”, as well as its possible origins 
in Winckelmann’s aesthetics, cf. Ekardt, 
personality.48 Warburg termed the product of the artistic mimesis of 
figures moving and moved “Zwischenraum” ( intermediate space) or 
“Distanzbewußtsein” (consciousness of distance), and he described it as 
“the substrate of artistic form-giving” (das Substrat künstlerischer Ge- 
staltung ).49 In line with the general anthropological perspective of 
both the Mnemosyne-introduction and the Kreuzlingen lecture War-
burg defines “the conscious creation of distance between oneself and 
the outer world” as the “foundational act of human civilization” (Be-
wußtes Distanzschaffen zwischen sich und der Außenwelt darf man 
wohl als Grundakt menschlicher Zivilisation bezeichnen).50 
The third function that Warburg assigns to mimesis is, then, best descri- 
bed through its spatialising character. Of all the Warburgian versions 
of artistic mimesis presented here, this probably comes closest to the 
maxim which Warburg once copied from Dilthey’s Die drei Epochen 
der modernen Ästhetik und ihre heutige Aufgabe, and which he con-
sidered a possible motto for his dissertation: “Dies Interesse ((an aller 
Kunstbetrachtung)) hängt nämlich an der Frage nach der Funktion der 
Kunst im geistigen Haushalt des Menschen(?)lebens.” (This interest (in 
all contemplation of art) depends upon the question of art’s function in 
the mental economy of human life.)51 By consciousness of distance and 
thinking-space (Denkraum), rephrased more generally as spatialization, 
Warburg understands the effect of an affective regulation or contain-
ment that posits the perceiving or affected subject at a secure remove 
from the cause of its agitation, i.e. from the impacting impression.52 If 
Warburg theorized mimesis according to the principles of Einfühlungs-
ästhetik as a constitutive element of the empathic process and more 
specifically as the imitation of the afterlife of the sensory stimulus, and 
if he also followed Vischer in assuming mimesis as the basis for a pro-
jective anthropomorphization which enables a worldview of mythical 
120–  ilinx 2, 2011
Ekardt, Psycho-Mimeses in Warburg
121
20 / 20
Maß und Umriss, pp. 259–261. 
53 / Cf. WIA III. 103.1, C3. Cf. also 
Horst Bredekamp’s and Michael Diers’ 
description of the pathos formulae as 
“Mittel der Angstbefreiung” (means for 
liberation from fear). Horst Bredekamp / 
Michael Diers: “Vorwort zur Studien- 
ausgabe”, in: Warburg, Gesammelte Schrif- 
ten, Vol I.1, p. 5*. 
54 / Konrad Hoffmann sketches a pre-
liminary genealogy of Warburg’s notion 
of the “Bild [...] als angstbewältigende 
Distanzierung” (image as a distancing 
that masters fear). He traces the princi-
ple of causation through Usener’s stud-
ies to Vignoli and Vico, while reserving 
its transfer to the realm of images for 
Warburg’s work . Konrad Hoffmann: 
“Angst und Methode nach Warburg. Er-
innerung als Veränderung”, in: Horst 
Bredekamp / Michael Diers / Charlotte 
Schoell-Glass (eds.), Aby Warburg. Ak-
ten des internationalen Symposions Ham- 
burg 1990, Weinheim 1991, pp. 261–267, 
here pp. 264–265.
causation and magical influence, the postulation of a spatialising mime-
sis marks an additional level in Warburg’s approach to Nachahmung. 
At stake here are emotions proper, and specifically their high arousal 
variants (‘passions’), as well as the question of how to contain or bind 
them. The pictorial imitation of the agitatedly expressive, gesturing, 
and moving body feeds back into the perceiving subject and stabiliz-
es his or her affectivity. More exactly: the image of the moving body 
counters phobia which Warburg singles out on a number of occasions 
as a specific affective tone to qualify the diagnosis of a general affective 
arousal.53 Fear may very well occupy the position of a primary emotio- 
nal response to affective impacts, against which the anthropological 
function of the pathos formulae in turn responds.54 Only if one consid-
ers this primacy of fear does one arrive at a full account of Warburg’s 
notion of a spatialising mimesis. Fear and its absence, finally, mark the 
emotional end of the psycho-mimetic spectrum on which Warburg’s 
theory of imitation unfolds. At its other end lie the sensory movements 
and constellations of perception by which the subject mimes the object. 
Situated in-between are anthropomorphizing projection, causational 
and magically influential miming, the pictorial rendering of moving 
figures, the imitations of the afterlife of stimuli, but also the artistic re-
turn to ancient forms, all of which serve as modulating mimeses in the 
realm of sensing and feeling.
